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Abstract
To address the group key management problem for modern networks this re-
search proposes a lightweight group key management protocol with a gossip-based
dissemination routine. Experiments show that by slightly increasing workload for the
key update mechanism, this protocol is superior to currently available tree-based pro-
tocols with respect to reliability and fault tolerance, while remaining scalable to large
groups. Java simulations show that the protocol eciently distributes keys to large
groups in the midst of up to 35 percent node failure rates. In addition, it eliminates
the need for logical key hierarchy while preserving an overall reduction in rekey mes-
sages to rekey a group. The protocol provides a simple \pull" mechanism to ensure
perfect rekeys in spite of the primary rekey mechanism's probabilistic guarantees,
without burdening key distribution facilities. Parameters for overlay management
and gossip are improved to minimize rekey message trac while remaining tolerant
to node failure.
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Scalable and Fault Tolerant Group Key Management
I. Introduction
Since the late 1990s, an increasing popularity in group-based messaging sys-
tems has stimulated research into secure group communication protocols. Today,
secure group communication is utilized in a wide array of applications, from military
command and control to power system monitoring and control and many others. The
secure group communication problem is beset by several subproblems, namely the
group key management problem, which asks: how can a group most eciently share
a common symmetric key secretly among communicating endpoints?
The group key management problem presents new challenges as modern network
topologies evolve and practical limitations prevent the continued use of currently
available algorithms. Specically, with secure group communications spanning wide
geographical regions and IP multicast becoming increasingly unsupported, group key
management is forced to rely heavily on mechanism development above the network
layer. Blindly applying dated multicast algorithms to overlay networks can result in
undesirable consequences and exhibit low levels of fault tolerance; Chapter 2 discusses
these drawbacks in detail.
1.1 Requirement for Scalability and Fault Tolerance in Future Networks
As the \Smart Grid" eort takes shape in North America, an initiative is un-
derway to deploy and synchronize phasor measurement units (PMUs) across the con-
tinent. The resultant \synchrophasor" technology monitors the health of power sys-
tems at individual locations by measuring phase angles on transmission lines, and
then comparing the waves from dierent locations against a common time source
such as global positioning satellite (GPS) [15]. This type of measurement can be used
eectively in power system state estimation and, when deployed continentally, can
potentially predict national power system events [15].
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The requirement for secure, scalable, wide-area communications follows directly
from this initiative. Note that as a result of deregulation within the power industry,
power system communications now rely almost exclusively on the Internet. As smaller
companies responsible for transmission and distribution enter the picture with perhaps
limited data capabilities, the need for fault tolerance becomes increasingly apparent.
This challenge presents a considerable opportunity to create a fault tolerant algorithm
for secure PMU communication in early stages of Smart Grid development.
1.2 Research Overview
To address the group key management problem for modern networks this re-
search proposes a lightweight group key management protocol with a gossip-based
dissemination routine. Experiments show that by slightly increasing workload for the
key update mechanism, this protocol is superior to currently available tree-based pro-
tocols with respect to reliability and fault tolerance, while remaining scalable to large
groups. In addition, it eliminates the need for logical key hierarchy while preserving an
overall reduction in rekey messages to rekey a group. The protocol provides a simple
\pull" mechanism to ensure perfect rekeys in spite of the primary rekey mechanism's
probabilistic guarantees, without burdening key distribution facilities.
Benets of this protocol are quantied versus tree-based dissemination in Java
simulations on networks exhibiting various node failure rates.
1.3 Organization
This thesis is organized as follows:
 Chapter 1: Introduces the problem and research goals.
 Chapter 2: Discusses the history of group key management, gossip-based mul-
ticast algorithms, and the need for secure and fault tolerant protocols in future
networks.
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 Chapter 3: Discusses the specic problem domain, proposes a protocol to re-
spond to the problem, and provides a methodology for evaluating the viability
of the presented protocol over existing tree-based protocols.
 Chapter 4: Provides quantitative results for the experiments outlined in Chap-
ter 3 and interprets the statistical signicance of any cause and eect relation-
ships.
 Chapter 5: Concludes with a summary of results and suggestions for future
research.
 Appendix A: Includes additional gures from Chapter 4.
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II. Literature Review
\It is recognized that future networks will have requirements that will
strain the capabilities of current key management architectures. One of
these requirements will be the secure multicast requirement. The need
for high bandwidth, very dynamic secure multicast communications is
increasingly evident in a wide variety of commercial, government, and
Internet communities. Specically, the secure multicast requirement is the
necessity for multiple users who share the same security attributes and
communication requirements to securely communicate with every other
member of the multicast group using a common multicast group net key."
{RFC 2627 [19]
Early research into group security protocols began largely in response to several
Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) requests for comment (RFC), namely RFC
1949, \Scalable Multicast Key Distribution" in 1996 [1], and RFC 2627, \Key Man-
agement for Multicast: Issues and Architectures" in 1999 [19]. Since the publication
of these RFCs, much research has been conducted to help solve the many challenges
of secure group communication and the underlying problem of group key manage-
ment. This chapter denes the group key management problem, outlines the specic
challenges of group key management, and reviews the relevant work that has been ac-
complished until now. Section 2.1.5.1 summarizes current research into gossip-based
multicast, and 1.1 discusses the emerging requirement for secure and fault tolerant
multicast communications systems.
2.1 Group Key Management
2.1.1 Denition. Group communication enables a single node on a data
network to send messages to many recipients. The group key management problem
addresses the dicult task of distributing and controlling encryption keys to eec-
tively secure group communication. Although point-to-point communications can
be eciently secured via public-key cryptography algorithms such as RSA [17] and
Die-Hellman-Merkle [4], group communication is not eciently encrypted with these
algorithms. In order for messages with many destinations to be eciently encrypted,
members must agree upon and share a secret, symmetric key which they then use for
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both encryption and decryption. Within the context of group communication, this is
called the group key.
A group key management protocol addresses the distribution of group keys
based upon the following primitives:
Centralization of key distribution and member management. A given proto-
col may stipulate that specic group members, called key distributors (KD),
be responsible for generating, disseminating, and controlling group keys. Alter-
nately, it may opt for a decentralized approach, leaving key distribution in the
hands of ordinary group members.
Rekey frequency. One of the most dening aspects of a given protocol is the fre-
quency at which KDs create and disseminate new keys. A protocol that opts to
rekey at specic time intervals may be more reliable (nodes know when to ask
for a new key if they miss an update), whereas a protocol that generates rekeys
only after a group key has been compromised may be more secure [19].
Join policy. When a node requests to join a group and receive its dissemination key,
the protocol species policy for authenticating the node, granting or denying its
request, supplying it the current group key, and ensuring that it receives future
key updates.
Leave policy. When a node requests to leave a group, the group key management
protocol decides whether to rekey active nodes or continue using the existing
group key. This depends on the particular group's security policy.
Removal policy. In the event that a node loses its group's trust and is selected for
removal, the group key management protocol responds according to the given
group's security policy. The consequences of this policy are closely related to
those of rekey frequency. Note that a group key management protocol does
not address the mechanisms that actually decide when to remove certain nodes;
that is instead the responsibility of a group management or trust protocol.
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Key dissemination mechanism. This describes the logical manner in which keys
move from the KDs to the member nodes. A given protocol's chosen dissemina-
tion mechanism is developed based upon its specic goals and constraints. The
following section outlines these goals and constraints, and Chapter 3 discusses
them with respect to the specic problem domain.
2.1.2 Challenges. The fundamental challenge of group key management can
be summarized in a question: how can group keys be shared most eciently so that
only the members of a group receive the key, and non-members cannot?
Like most problems in distributed systems and security, the answer is actually
a second line of questions which collectively ask, \Which aspects of group key man-
agement are most important to the specic application?" The following list outlines
the most common goals and constraints that arise in group key management, with
respect to key initialization and group rekeying [5]:
 scalability
 platform portability and independence
 ease of use (end user and API)
 use of multicast (for the group key management system itself)
 performance (load, number of messages per rekey)
 key lifetime, escrow, perfect forward secrecy (PFS)
 cryptographic techniques (encrypting, signing)
 integration with security at other layers
 cost
 fault tolerance
 network topology (logical and physical)
 exibility, user modiability
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The majority of research over the past decade focuses almost exclusively on
optimizing some subset of the issues listed above. In particular, scalability, use of
multicast, and performance have been high-value research areas and drive the majority
of modern technique development. Platform independence has recently emerged as
an area of interest for multicast over wide area networks (WAN), with the virtual
abandonment of MBONE around the turn of the century. Development of WAN group
communication protocols has been left to rely heavily on mechanism development
above the network layer.
There is no single, unied solution that optimizes all of the subproblems listed
above. Most solutions that exist today come with a system of trade-os that value
some aspects at the expense of others. The following subsections explore existing
solutions to secure group communication and the group key management problem.
2.1.3 Early Solutions. The earliest and simplest group key management
solutions, such as those found in RFC 1949 and RFC 2093, proposed frameworks to
establish and disseminate session keys via at topologies or trees. In this context, a
at topology is one in which a KD communicates directly with each member node
to establish keys; as a group becomes very large, the KD will eventually become
overburdened and cease functioning properly or eciently. A tree topology utilizes
a tree data structure to more eciently delegate the key dissemination workload to
interior tree nodes. See Figure 2.1 for the general concept of tree-based dissemination:
the KD exists at the root of a tree whose remaining nodes represent other nodes on
the network; when a new key must be disseminated, the key KD forwards the new
key to its children only, and the children pass the key to their children, and so forth
until every node in the tree has received the new key. These tree-based frameworks
provide high levels of reliability and performance (i.e., few messages required for rekeys
and removals, fast delivery from root to leaf) and are generally easy to implement.
However, tree-based solutions come with the penalty of either low fault tolerance
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Figure 2.1: Tree-based dissemination via infrastructure or
overlay
or lack of scalability. The following subsections explore the specic benets and
shortcomings of early implementations.
2.1.3.1 Core Based Tree. Ballardie et al. proposed RFC 1949, which
species a solution for Internet Protocol (IP) multicast. The protocol suggests in-
tegrating \Core Based Trees" into Internet Group Management Protocol IGMPv1
to provide a key management system in which \core" and non-core routers control
the ow of multicast keys, potentially with worldwide application. However, since
the core routers are dened statically, the resultant tree forms a rigid design that is
susceptible to modern denial-of-service (DoS) attacks. If one interior node were to
become unavailable, a potentially large section of the recipient population could no
longer receive key updates and other multicast messages. A solution to this vulner-
ability is to maintain knowledge about larger sections of the tree at each node with
the intent of bypassing faulty nodes; however, because of the added responsibility for
non-core nodes, the CBT implementation provides no such solution. In addition to
these shortcomings, CBT's implementation at the network layer makes it applicable
only on networks where IP multicast is supported. Therefore this solution is limited
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in scope by practical barriers; the requirement for specic router conguration makes
it infeasible for WAN and ad hoc deployments.
2.1.3.2 GKMP. Harney and Muckenhirn presented Group Key Man-
agement Protocol (GKMP) in RFCs 2093 and 2094 [10] [9]. Unlike CBT, GKMP is
an application-layer protocol that denes a role-based framework for key distribution
instead of a network-level infrastructure. Although not required, GKMP may utilize
and benet from an underlying multicast messaging system. The framework species
the designation of a central KD for each group that is responsible for creating and
delivering new keys, but it does not specify a physical transport mechanism. How-
ever, with GKMP, the KD must verify every key update via a receipt message from
each member node. Although this provides a high level of reliability, it does not scale
well as groups become very large. In particular, KDs suer a massive performance
decrease during large group rekeys since each group member must respond directly
to the distributor to conrm receipt.
2.1.4 Modern Solutions.
2.1.4.1 Iolus. Mittra [16] proposes Iolus, a framework for group key
management that also allows secure multicasting. Iolus presents a tree-based dissem-
ination model that places key management in the hands of a single group security
controller (GSC) and several group security intermediaries (GSI), which function to-
gether as a distributed KD. Figure 2.2 shows a small-scale sample of a group utilizing
the Iolus framework. The GSC creates the group key and sends it to only the GSIs
that it knows about. The innermost GSIs then forward the key onto some group
members and additional GSIs. This dissemination scheme reduces the overhead of a
single rekey on any given node (including the GSC) to a constant, depending upon
the tree formation policy. In addition, secure unicast links between each pair provide
the ability to deliver key updates without the need for special \key encryption keys"
used in some implementations.
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Figure 2.2: Tree-based key dissemination with Iolus utilizes a
single GSC and multiple GSIs.
Although Iolus meets its goal of scalability, it lacks a necessary level of fault
tolerance for large groups. Specically, if a single GSI near the GSC becomes in-
operable, the sizable portion of the group subordinate to that GSI will not receive
key updates; this is a signicant drawback in an asynchronous rekeying environment.
Even with periodic rekeys, attempts to recover from a single faulty GSI will likely
cascade into catastrophic failure when aected members between the faulty GSI and
the edge bombard inner GSIs and the GSC with rekey requests.
However, the framework provides a valuable reference model upon which several
other modern group key management protocols are based, including Hubenko's satel-
lite key management protocol [12]; thus it is included in this document as a modern
solution. We learn much from the delegation of key dissemination responsibilities and
the use of secure unicast links for point-to-point propagation.
2.1.4.2 GSAKMP. RFC 4535 [8] denes the Group Secure Associ-
ation Key Management Protocol GSAKMP, whose rekey policy, by default, relies
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on Logical Key Hierarchy LKH. Developed in 1998, Logical Key Hierarchy (LKH)
species the use of key graphs{trees that logically represent special \key encryption
keys" (KEK) and users in a group [20]. Note the dissimilarity between LKH and
tree-based dissemination protocols like Iolus; in LKH, interior tree nodes represent
KEKs, and leaf nodes represent users. Each leaf has a single parent node that acts
as the user's unique key. In tree-based dissemination protocols, interior nodes are
physical endpoints.
LKH is useful for reducing bandwidth requirements when group controllers are
solely responsible for the task of key dissemination. The number of rekey messages
required to rekey an entire group after a single member is removed is  logN   1,
where  is the degree of the tree and N is the total number of group members.
However, this still tends to be a rather large burden on the group controller as N
becomes very large. Also, any delegation of the key update mechanism via a tree-based
dissemination routine encounters the same issues with fault tolerance as described in
Section 2.1.4.1. Thus, even modern key management protocols like GSAKMP suer
many of the same issues as early protocols. Either central key managers accept the
burden of rekeying large sections of groups, or the group relies on a fault-intolerant
dissemination mechanism.
2.1.5 Gossip-based Security Solutions.
2.1.5.1 Gossip Denition.
Bimodal Multicast. Developed separately in 1987 by Demers
and Birman [3] [2], \gossip" multicast (referred to by Demers as \epidemic") de-
ned a framework for probabilistic message dissemination that opened a new area of
research in distributed computing. This class of algorithms adapts the sociological
phenomenon of the same name to network message handling; when a person becomes
aware of some information that may be valuable to her community, she communicates
that information to a small, random group of her friends; her friends follow suit and so
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forth, until nally the message seems to have been communicated so much that there
is no point in passing it any further. These are also called \epidemic" algorithms as
they seem to model the spread of disease in living organisms [3].
Gossip Description. Originally designed for fully-connected net-
works, gossip dened a method for a single node on a network to deliver a message
to all other endpoints on the same network without contacting each recipient node
directly [2] [3].
As an example, consider a fully-connected network including nodes A through
Z. If node A wants to deliver a message to nodes B through Z, it has several options.
In a non-gossip implementation, node A contacts node B, then contacts node C, and
so forth until it has contacted every other node. With gossip dissemination, node A
randomly contacts a subset of other nodes (say, nodes D and F), and then nodes D
and F randomly contact some other subset of nodes until the other nodes have likely
received the message. Note the word \likely." The stochastic nature of gossip creates
a small probability that some intended recipients will not receive a given message.
To reduce this probability (or at least account for it), gossip relies upon two
basic parameters: a number of rounds that the message will be forwarded, and a
percentage likelihood that a node will forward a message to another node. The latter
is referred to in this text as infectivity.
Rounds can be dened several ways, but the premise is that, during one round,
a node that has received a gossiped message will randomly forward the message to
a neighboring node. This can be performed via a synchronized clock, where a round
might correspond to one or more clock ticks. In this text, a round is dened as a
non-synchronized countdown. That is, when the original message is constructed, it
attaches a maximum round number. When the message is forwarded, the forwarding
node decrements the rounds value; as the message traverses the network, it eventually
reaches zero. When a message is received with a round number equal to zero, it is
forwarded no more.
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Infectivity is the likelihood that, during a round, a node will forward a gossiped
message. When a node receives a gossiped message, it randomly selects recipient
nodes from its neighbors and, based upon the infectivity-weighted random value,
either forwards the message or simply waits that round.
These parameters impact the number of transmissions for a single message
traversing a network and the likelihood that a node will miss a message. Increas-
ing either parameter will result in more transmissions but fewer missed nodes. (In
the remainder of this text, \messages," when used as a performance metric, refers to
the actual number of transmissions.)
In addition to these parameters, this research investigates reducing the average
k-connectivity of the network from a full mesh to increase reliability while reducing
message trac.
Benets. Gossip algorithms provide highly probabilistic delivery
guarantees while minimizing network resource consumption. In addition, this class
of algorithms shows improved resilience to changes in network topology over existing
multicast algorithms, particularly ones that are based upon routing trees. Of partic-
ular benet to the problem domain, gossip-based protocols function well even when
individual nodes have little or no advance knowledge about the surrounding network
topology. Nodes need only know about their neighbors to successfully disseminate
group messages [3] [2].
Modern Advancements. Modern implementations borrow the
terms infectivity and susceptibility from epidemiology to describe the rate at which
nodes seek to \push" data to their neighbors and the rate at which nodes desire
data from neighbors. Hopkinson et al. [14] propose a \gravitational" gossip algorithm
wherein member nodes propagate information based upon the product of these values
per connected node pair. In [11], the same authors apply heuristics to gravitational
gossip to dynamically modify gossip probabilities as network conditions change.
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Other Applications in Distributed Systems. Although originally
applied to reliable database replication [3], gossip is applied successfully in other
areas of distributed computing, for instance in mobile ad hoc routing and peer-to-peer
overlay management. Haas et al. [7] apply gossip in mobile ad hoc routing and suggest
parameters for gossip rates; however, their experiments are applied only to perfectly
manicured grid overlays (requiring many links) and do not model node failure. Jelasity
et al. [13] apply gossip for peer sampling in wide area overlay management. The
decision to utilize gossip for overlays asserts a trend in fault tolerant computing; as
the viability of tree-based and other hierarchical algorithms diminishes, fault-tolerant
overlay management relies comfortably upon the high level of adaptability and low
maintenance costs aorded by gossip.
2.1.5.2 Gossip with Virtual Synchrony. Yan et al. [21] propose gossip
with virtual synchrony, a layered approach that is similar in spirit to the solution
presented in this manuscript, but lacks critical implementation detail. Specically,
the authors' choice of virtual synchrony seems to indicate a preference of perfect rekey
reliability at perhaps a large performance cost. Additionally, the supplied performance
analysis models only the eect of network size on request overhead and throughput,
against a protocol not specically intended for group key dissemination. The existence
of this protocol is noted primarily to credit the authors for establishing the legitimacy
of a gossip-based dissemination policy.
2.1.5.3 GOSKEY. Graham [6] presents GOSKEY, a protocol for
on-demand key distribution in which message senders provide a unique key for each
message they send, acting as both a group member and KD. GOSKEY aims to reduce
end-to-end delay of encrypted multicast messages and increase fault tolerance within
a wireless ad-hoc network.
GOSKEY's functionality is summarized with its key dissemination routine,
which is invoked when a group member wishes to encrypt a message to be sent to
other group members [6]:
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1. Member creates new group key K.
2. Member gossips K to its neighbors via pre-established secure unicast links.
3. Member encrypts message M with K to create MK .
4. Member broadcasts MK to its group via some separate pathway.
To support this routine, other nodes belonging to the same group implement
the following routine upon receiving K:
1. Member receives K and immediately gossips K to its own neighbors.
2. Member stores K in a cache in expectation of receiving MK .
Additionally, recipient nodes employ the following logic upon receiving MK :
1. If Member has K in its cache, it decrypts MK into M.
2. If Member does not have K, it requests K from the message's originator, then
decrypts MK into M.
Graham leaves components of these procedures abstracted, most importantly
the gossip parameters used during experimentation and the method for creating and
destroying the secure unicast links. Although it mentions the use of an access control
list (ACL), it does not specically utilize it in the context of any group membership
action such as a join or a leave.
The solution provided in this manuscript borrows only GOSKEY's dissemina-
tion mechanism to achieve whole-group key agreement. It also leverages the mecha-
nism to support the group key management primitives (e.g., join, remove, leave) and
denes a peer linking method to create and maintain the underlying topology. This
is described in further detail in Chapter 3.
2.1.6 Summary. Modern group key management protocols tend to suer
the same drawbacks as early protocols, namely with respect to fault intolerant tree-
based key distribution policies. While some protocols have successfully reduced the
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workload placed on KDs, group security controllers, and group controllers, they have
only marginally advanced in delegating key dissemination responsibilities without
sacricing fault tolerance. Recent studies suggest the viability of gossip-based key
dissemination but present them in fundamentally dierent contexts with dierent
goals.
Chapter 3 proposes a gossip-based group key management protocol that e-
ciently supports secure, wide-area communications involving many nodes, while sat-
isfying the additional requirement of fault tolerance.
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III. Methodology
This chapter denes the group key management problem, provides an algorithm to
solve it for the specied problem domain, and presents methods to test it empirically
against tree-based dissemination.
3.1 Problem Denition
Group communication becomes increasingly complex with the addition of the
security requirement. Intuitively, as specic security requirements are added, the
complexity of the required algorithm increases accordingly. Most currently available
algorithms for secure group communication value reliability above other requirements,
often at the cost of scalability, and sometimes with an additional requirement of
topology control. This chapter expresses a model for group key management that
relaxes the reliability requirement of certain operations to a highly probabilistic level.
As a result, this establishes greater fault tolerance, reduces the number of messages
for rekey operations, and eliminates the need for advanced topology control. Most
importantly, this design provides a greater level of fault tolerance over existing designs,
such as tree-based algorithms discussed in Chapter 2. Specically, a small number of
failing nodes has a far less devastating eect on reliability at any given point.
3.1.1 Problem Domain. The selected group key management problem do-
main is dened by a) varying levels of infrastructural connectedness within the net-
work under test, as well as b) varying levels of node failure. It should be made clear
that this failure rate is dierent from the rate at which nodes deliberately request
and rescind their group memberships. Although a given algorithm may treat the two
situations the same, they are distinctly dierent actions with respect to the security
model, described in Section 3.2.1.
3.1.2 Goals and Hypothesis. The proposed model for secure multicast com-
munication aims to accomplish the following:
1. Maintain algorithmic complexity for exchanging encryption keys at a constant.
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2. Reduce the algorithmic complexity for subgroup joins and leaves to a constant.
3. Minimize dependence upon central keying or certicate authorities for encryp-
tion and authentication.
4. Require nodes to have no knowledge of a global topology (i.e., each node knows
only its neighbors).
5. Survive DoS and replay attacks.
6. Withstand faults by employing gossip-based \pull" routines and randomized
topology control
The researcher hypothesizes that, given the relaxation of the reliability require-
ment, the proposed algorithm and model will exhibit higher levels of fault tolerance
than currently available group key management protocols, with a very manageable
impact on performance.
3.2 Approach
This section describes the security model and proposes an algorithm for group
key management. It also addresses any assumptions, limitations, and vulnerabilities
that may result. For a comprehensive explanation of security concepts, see [18].
3.2.1 Security Model. The goal of this research is to explore a new solution
to the group key management problem{to provide member nodes on a network the
ability to communicate securely to a group of other nodes on the network.
In order to classify this design as a legitimate key agreement protocol, the
following description addresses the properties and actions of the proposed design.
The security model is dened by the following security primitives:
Authentication For a node to be able to receive or transmit any message on any
part of the network, it must have the requisite credentials to do so. This pro-
tocol takes a hybrid approach to authentication by issuing signed certicates to
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operate (CTOs) for validating a node's request to join a group. This is described
in further detail in Section 3.2.3.1.
Forward secrecy A message that was encrypted with an expired group key cannot
be decrypted with the current group key or any future group key.
Accordingly, the actions to support the security model are dened as follows:
Join The Join primitive provides a Requestor the ability to become a Member of a
key management group. In order to join, a Requestor must have credentials
that are recognizable by the group controller, and must not exist on the group
controller's blacklist.
Leave A node may elect to leave the group and discontinue further receipt of (and
obligation to retransmit) any key update messages. Since it has not been de-
liberately removed, this action does not require special security measures; the
node noties its neighbors of its intent to discontinue participation only for the
proper functioning of the messaging protocol
Remove When a group has lost trust in a node, the security controller must take
actions to preserve forward secrecy. Within the context of group key manage-
ment, the Remove operation is responsible for ensuring that members selected
for removal cannot receive the new key or any future key updates. It may also
specify policy for performing out-of-band, or \asynchronous," Rekey operations
to immediately close security holes.
Rekey The KD must generate and supply new group keys to members when directed
by the group manager, or periodically by policy. The Rekey action dictates how
the new keys are delivered to group member nodes so that only trusted members
receive the new key and blacklisted members cannot.
3.2.2 Key Management Protocol Overview. With respect to the specic
problem domain characteristics, this research strives to nd the best algorithm for
key exchange in networks marked by generally high levels of connectedness and vary-
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ing levels of participation by specic nodes. As such, the protocol presented herein
employs an algorithm that adapts to these constraints while accomplishing its goals.
The central component of the proposed design is gossip-based physical key
distribution. This behavior is combined with random peer sampling to achieve an
application-layer model that meets the goals outlined above. The following sections
describe the proposed algorithm's key management logic.
3.2.3 Key Management Core Routines.
3.2.3.1 Join (Requestor). A node wishing to join a secure group
contact the KD to authenticate its connection to the group and begin receiving group
key updates. The following pseudocode describes the join process concisely:
1. Requestor establishes secure public key infrastructure (PKI) session with KD
via three-way handshake
2. Requestor requests certicate to operate (CTO) from KD
3. If Requestor is on blacklist, KD denies Requestor's request and ends secure
session; else, KD generates CTO for Requestor with the following information:
(a) List of peers with whom Member shall connect
(b) Current group key
(c) Timestamp
4. KD signs CTO with its private key and delivers signed CTO to Requestor
5. For each peer provided via CTO, Requestor:
(a) Establishes secure PKI session with peer
(b) Presents CTO to peer
(c) Maintains secure session to propagate future key updates
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The above pseudocode assumes in step 5b that the CTO being provided is
current and valid. However, this may not be the case, as a blacklisted member may
attempt to rejoin a group with an old or forged CTO. To prevent an unauthorized
connection from being established, active members must validate these connection
requests via the following auxiliary logic:
1. Member accepts Requestor's secure session request and labels session \Request"
2. Member receives Requestor's CTO
3. Member validates CTO integrity and authenticity with KD's public key; if CTO
is corrupt or not authentic, Member ends session
4. Member compares CTO timestamp to current time; if CTO is too old, Member
ends session
5. Member approves connection and relabels session \Key Management"
The above logic assumes the following is true:
1. Nodes know KD's destination address and its public key prior to submitting a
request
2. A data path exists between each member and the KD (although they do not
necessarily maintain a secure unicast link)
3. All members and KD have unique public and private key pairs
4. Nodes are synchronized against a common time source (e.g., global positioning
satellite). The accuracy, or \stratum" level, of the time source should be con-
sidered when deciding rekey frequency and skew tolerance. Whereas Network
Time Protocol (NTP) may be sucient in applications with daily rekeying, GPS
is more suitable to hourly rekeys or when asynchronous rekeys are common.
After the Join operation is successfully executed, a Requestor becomes a Mem-
ber until either Leave or Remove operations are carried out against the Member. For
eciency, the secure session used for CTO verication is preserved and relabeled for
group key updates.
21
3.2.3.2 Rekey (KD). Either at specic time intervals, or due to a
member's removal, the KD will generate a new group key and disseminate the new key
to its peers for propagation to the entire group. The KD executes the following logic
to govern this procedure. The gossip-style behavior is achieved when the members
connected to the KD receive the Rekey message; the gossip logic is described in the
Rekey (Member) routine in Section 3.2.3.3.
1. KD generates random new group key
2. KD constructs Rekey message with the following information:
(a) New group key
(b) Timestamp
(c) Recently blacklisted members
3. KD signs Rekey message with KD's private key
4. KD appends number of total requested gossip rounds (unsigned) and delivers
to each of its peers, except for blacklisted members
Note that the gossip rounds eld is left unsigned so that Members can decre-
ment this value without aecting the integrity of the Rekey message itself. This
presents a minor vulnerability since a \rogue" member may increase this value in-
stead of decrementing it (see Section 3.2.3.3). This vulnerability is mitigated by the
signed timestamp; Rekey propagation ceases after the globally-specied threshold has
elapsed, and gossip round numbers are rendered moot.
3.2.3.3 Rekey (Member). The heart of this protocol is each Member's
responsibility to propagate Rekeys to other Members in the group. This stage intro-
duces the gossip-based dissemination logic from which the protocol achieves its fault
tolerant benets. Members adhere to the logic below to propagate new group keys
randomly to their neighbors:
1. Member receives Rekey message from peer (KD or other Member)
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2. If Rekey message has already been received, Member does nothing; else,
3. Member authenticates Rekey message as follows:
(a) Member veries Rekey authenticity with KD's public key
(b) Member checks Rekey timestamp; if timestamp predates current key's
birthdate or Rekey threshold has elapsed, Member does nothing and exits;
else:
4. Member applies new group key for later use in group communications
5. Member forwards the Rekey message to its peers
(a) If gossip rounds value is 0, exit; else,
(b) Decrement gossip rounds value by 1
(c) Forward original Rekey message (with decremented round number) to ran-
dom subset of peers (except blacklisted Members) based on current infec-
tivity rate and round number
3.2.3.4 Remove (KD/Member). When a member is forcefully removed
from the group, a rekey must be performed asynchronously so that the removed
member cannot receive future group transmissions. This action is carried out jointly
by the KD and the peers of the removed member. The KD executes the following:
1. KD receives direction to remove Member from group
2. KD directly noties removed members' peers of upcoming removal via PKI
3. Each Member ends secure session with removed Member
4. KD performs asynchronous Rekey, adding removed members to blacklist
This process is remarkably simpler than existing solutions, which often require
many \key encryption keys" to be generated, updated, and individually disseminated,
such as in LKH [20]. Instead, this routine relies upon secure point-to-point sessions
and a novel dissemination policy that prevents removed members from receiving the
new group key.
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3.2.3.5 Leave. A Member voluntarily departing a group may or may
not have security implications. Therefore, it is within the group manager's discretion
whether to perform a Rekey after a Member leaves. However, to correctly manage
the key update overlay, the KD should be apprised of members leaving the group.
Therefore, in implementations that do not require a Rekey, a departing Member
timestamps, encrypts, signs, and transmits a single Leave message to the KD, and
ends all peer sessions. If this is not done, future transmissions to the departed node
are treated as missed messages.
3.2.4 Key Management Auxiliary Routines. Several of the above primitives
depend upon auxiliary logic to ensure proper dissemination and reduce unnecessary
communication between Members and the KD.
3.2.4.1 Await New Key / Neighbor Rekey Request (Member). The pro-
tocol employs periodic rekeys specically to account for the probabilistic convergence
of the gossip-based Rekey routine. That is, after each scheduled Rekey, a proba-
bilistically small number of nodes will not receive the new key. To account for this
discrepancy, each node enters an \active waiting" state at the scheduled Rekey inter-
vals. If a new key does not arrive within a specied window following the scheduled
Rekey, the node will request the new key from its peers, who probably received it. In
the very rare instance that a node and none of its neighbors receive the current key,
it can be estimated with high probability that a Rekey was in fact not performed. In
this instance a node will wait a random period of time over a lengthy interval, then
request a Rekey directly from the KD (and disseminate to its peers). The random
wait prevents nodes from unwittingly overloading the KD, thereby exacerbating the
impact of a missed Rekey. After receiving the new key, the left-out member executes
the Rekey (Member) routine, omitting the propagation step.
For asynchronous rekeys, there is no way for missed nodes to know that they did
not receive a new key without contacting peers. In these instances, a probabilistically
small number of nodes may continue for some time (not exceeding the periodic Rekey
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interval) without the current group key. However, providing a \pull" mechanism to
account for this situation may cause more problems than it solves. Consider a single
node that does not receive an asynchronous Rekey. If the left-out node receives a
message encrypted with an unrecognized group key, it attempts to obtain the \new"
group key from either its peers or the KD. If there was in fact an asynchronous Rekey,
then the left-out node obtains the new group key with minimal impact to network
trac. However, it becomes too easy for a single malicious node to send out many
messages encrypted with a false \new" key. The result is a saturated network, as
all group members simultaneously rush to discover the unknown key. Therefore, if
a message is received that has been encrypted with an unknown key, it is in the
entire group's best interest for the left-out node to await the next periodic Rekey.
Additionally, it may be in the KD's best interest to limit asynchronous Rekeys, at the
cost of allowing blacklisted members to read encrypted group trac until the next
scheduled Rekey. This policy can be determined based on the group's specic security
priorities.
3.2.4.2 Provide Missed Key (Member/KD). Following the above logic,
missed synchronous Rekeys are followed by key requests. Each member must be able
to respond to these requests by providing the signed Rekey message in its original
state to the left-out member. To facilitate this feature, the KD and each member are
responsible for keeping the last signed Rekey message it sent or received.
3.2.4.3 Island Detection (KD). After many joins and leaves, and
during times of higher failure, it is possible that the peer network will form \islands,"
or subgroups that have no peer path to or from the KD. A simple method for rejoining
these subgroups with the KD-reachable group is for the KD to deliver extra certicates
to operate to nodes that request synchronous rekeys directly from the KD. Since after
every synchronous rekey, the KD knows which nodes were reached and which were
not, the KD can pair unreachable nodes with reachable nodes via the CTO. That is,
the KD provides each unreachable node with the address of a node that was reached
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during the last synchronous rekey. The KD is able to perform this operation with
only an ACL and a single extra message, and need not retain any long-term special
information about the topology to make this work.
3.2.4.4 Attack Prevention. This section summarizes the techniques
employed by this protocol that prevent DoS and replay attacks.
Denial of Service. The protocol's time synchronization allows
for certain actions to take place during predetermined time slots. For example, syn-
chronous rekeys occur at specic times for only a short duration. During that period,
a node that has not received the new key can request a retransmission from its neigh-
boring nodes and the KD. However, such requests made outside this period will be
ignored; this prevents a malicious node from permanently overloading the KD's queue
and denying other members the KD's services.
Additionally, to prevent a bogus rekey message from being propagated through-
out the network, the Rekey messages are authenticated with the KD's public key
before being forwarded. Without this feature, a malicious node could create false
rekey messages and \forward" them as though they were legitimate.
Replay Attacks. Time stamping and signing (in that order) all
Rekey messages prevents replay attacks. Specically, it prevents a malicious node
from redelivering an old Rekey message and setting the group key to an old key that
may have been compromised.
3.3 System Boundaries
The group key management problem aims to provide usable keys to authenti-
cated users for the purpose of secure subgroup communications. For this reason, this
system is limited in scope to the management and dissemination of keys, while the
specic use of these keys is not studied. For instance, a system designer may opt
to use a gossip-based group key management system but utilize a tree-based mul-
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ticast algorithm or point-to-point messaging for the encrypted messages. Certainly,
a key management subsystem lends itself to a wide variety of higher-level software
implementations.
3.4 System Services
The actions outlined in Section 3.2.3 provide the major services of the proposed
protocol. The Join, Leave, Remove, and Rekey actions oer users the necessary
mechanisms to obtain and update group keys for the purpose of secure group com-
munications.
3.5 Workload
For this study, the workload is a single Rekey message. The Rekey message
originates at the KD and broadcasts outwards to the member nodes belonging to
the same group. The message contains only the new key, and does not specify any
blacklisted members.
3.6 Performance Metrics
1. Total messages sent. This is the sum of gossip \pushes," neighbor rekey requests,
and requests sent to the KD that could not be answered via neighbor rekey
requests.
2. KD-direct rekeys / Unreached healthy nodes. Since a specic goal is to mini-
mize dependence upon central key authorities, the number of nodes that must
be rekeyed by the KD are quantied separately. In an asynchronous rekeying
environment, this number is equated to healthy nodes that are not reached by
either the gossip push or pull routines.
See Section 3.8 for a further description of how these metrics are utilized for
experimental design.
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3.7 System Parameters
The following values are tested:
1. Peer links. This species the total number of link pairs used for key dissemina-
tion.
2. Infectivity. This is the percentage likelihood that a given node may spread a
key update to a peer.
3. Gossip rounds. This is the total number of times that a given message instance
will be passed along before it dies.
4. Topology. This research examines a randomized peer topology versus tree-based
and \torus" topologies. A torus topology is a ring overlay that is engineered
specically for fault tolerance. See Figure 3.1 for a visual example.
3.8 Evaluation Technique
Java-based simulations are conducted for each experiment. Data for the averages
of multiple runs are output to comma-delimited spreadsheets and analyzed with the
JMP 8 statistical software package.
For the parameters listed in Section 3.7, the rekey mechanism is compared with
the tree-based rekey mechanism favored by modern implementations.
3.9 Experiment Setup
Experiments are divided into ve parts. Part 1 improves the parameters for
synchronous rekeys with neighbor rekey requests enabled. Part 2 improves the pa-
rameters for asynchronous rekeys with island detection enabled. Part 3 compares
improved asynchronous rekeys with the proposed protocol versus a tree-based dis-
semination routine that does not utilize any of the failure recovery methods described
in this research. Part 4 tests whether the improved parameters for asynchronous
rekeys can benet from a managed overlay (specically, a torus) over a random over-
lay. Part 5 tests scalability to large groups by comparing performance metrics of a
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Figure 3.1: A torus overlay provides fault tolerance with many
redundant links
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1000-node group to those of a 100-node group. For each set of parameters, the sim-
ulation generates 2000 random graphs and simulates a single rekey event per graph,
counting the messages as they are passed. After the rekey has completed, the simu-
lation counts how many healthy nodes received the rekey message. For synchronous
rekeys, the simulation counts how many nodes were forced to contact the KD directly
after a round of neighbor rekey requests. In this way the simulation quickly inspects
a \moment in time" on an arbitrary group that has already seen several members join
and leave.
To improve the synchronous rekey parameters, a simple genetic algorithm is
employed to minimize the following weighted sum tness function:
fitness = averagetotalmessages+ pmult  averageKDrequests
(3.1)
where pmult is a penalty multiplier, described further in the next paragraph. In this
way, the algorithm rewards a low number of overall messages sent for a synchronous
rekey and penalizes the expensive requests made directly to the KD. This achieves
the goal of primarily maximizing eciency and secondarily minimizing expensive fault
situations for synchronous rekeys.
To improve the asynchronous rekey parameters, a similar genetic algorithm is
employed to minimize the following weighted sum tness function:
fitness = averagemissednodes+ pmult  averagetotalmessages
(3.2)
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where averagemissednodes corresponds to the number of nodes that are not reached
during a single rekey push. This time, the algorithm rewards high levels of rst-push
convergence and penalizes situations that require many messages.
Note the importance of the penalty multiplier. Without it, the two tness
functions would be identical. In fact, over-penalizing KD-direct rekeys during a syn-
chronous rekey would result in tness values that resembled an asynchronous rekey.
More concisely, pmult is set to indicate the level of importance of eciency during
synchronous rekeys, and the importance of reliability during asynchronous rekeys.
This may vary between applications and administrator preference, but should not be
too high in either case. A pmult of 3 is used for synchronous rekeys during experi-
ments, indicating that a KD-direct rekey has the perceived negative eect on eciency
of sending 3 extra messages. For asynchronous rekeys, a pmult of 0:01 is used. In
this way, the benet of a small number of missed nodes can only be oset by a very
large number of extra messages. Thus, the pmult value is the weighted aspect of each
weighted sum function.
Each round of the genetic algorithm selects a set of parameters from the superior
solution pool and sets between 1 and all of the parameters to a random new value in
the mutating parameter's range. To maintain solution diversity, the probability that
1, 2, and 3 parameters will mutate in a given round are set to 60%, 25%, and 15%,
respectively. Additionally, no unique set of parameters may to enter the superior
solution set more than once.
For each scenario, 250; 000 trials are performed for failure rates ranging from
5% to 40% in 5% increments, maintaining a pool of 40 of the most superior parameter
sets according to tness value.
Once the improved parameters are achieved for each failure rate, the algorithm is
then compared in simulations against unimproved tree-based solutions and improved
torus-based solutions for the entire range of failure rates between 5% and 40% (36
failure rates in total). This exercise determines a) whether a random overlay topology
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with improved parameters can perform with greater fault tolerance than existing tree-
based routines (no improved parameters, no fault recovery heuristics) and b) whether
heavily managing a fault tolerant overlay with improved parameters has any benet.
To study scalability, improved parameters from the previous experiments are
applied to a graph of 1000 nodes and performance is evaluated under 5{40% failure
rates based upon the metrics described in section 3.6. The researcher hypothesizes
that the total messages required to rekey the group will remain in direct proportion
to the total number of nodes for a given failure rate; note that this increased burden
is distributed among the member nodes rather than falling entirely on the KD as it
would in other protocols.
3.9.1 Input Graphs. With the exception of the scalability experiment, the
input graph for each trial is of size 100 nodes. The graph is generated randomly to
model a \slice in time" that represents a given network that has encountered several
member joins and leaves. By design, this may lead to disjoint graphs in situations
where there are few links, thus the benet of island detection and repair feature.
For each parameter scenario, a new input graph is generated per run to ensure that
performance metrics are measured as an average of many runs. The major benet
of this criteria is the practicality of measuring the protocol against a network that
changes over time; the major disadvantage is the processing cost of generating many
simulated networks.
3.10 Summary
A framework is provided for group key exchange that aords high levels of
fault tolerance while keeping messaging load to a minimum. A method is provided
to improve these parameters for varying levels of intermittent node failure among a
given group, and experiments are presented to illustrate their value versus existing
key management techniques. Experimental results are discussed in Chapter 4.
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IV. Results
This chapter summarizes the results of the experiments outlined in Chapter 3.
4.1 Synchronous Rekey Parameter Improvement
After 250; 000 generations, the optimal parameters for the synchronous rekey
trials converge. For all failure rates, the algorithm favored the lowest possible number
of links, high infectivity, and an average of 6:5 gossip rounds (+/- .2, 95% CI). No-
tably these parameters closely resemble parameters of a binary tree (log2100  6:643).
That is, for synchronous rekeys, an algorithm that heavily favors eciency will nat-
urally suggest ooding via binary trees or a similar overlay. The analysis of fault
tolerance follows: the expense of some member nodes having to contact the key dis-
tributor directly for a rekey is absorbed by the overwhelming eciency of a tree-based
algorithm. Note that for security concerns, this analysis applies only to synchronous
rekeys, in which members have the ability to request rekey messages from other nodes
and the KD.
4.2 Asynchronous Rekey Parameter Improvement
The improved parameters for asynchronous rekeys also converge, but on a much
dierent set of values. In this scenario, the best solutions are marked by maximum
infectivity levels (95   100%), arbitrarily many gossip rounds, and a relatively low
number of links that rose with respect to node failure rate. Indeed, a graph could be
drawn to model the relationship between a given failure rate and the number of peer
links required to minimize the tness function.
To illuminate this relationship, extra simulations were built to measure the
eciency of each number of peer links over the entire parameter range while keeping
infectivity set to 100% and gossip rounds set to innity (i.e., a message ooding
scenario). For each of the 36 failure rates from 5% to 40%, a regression is applied to
the tness values, and the number of links corresponding to the minimum response
is computed with statistical software. The improved links values are then graphed
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Figure 4.1: Fitness values by links, 5 percent failure rate
against their respective failure rates, and a nal regression is applied to the improved
links values. All regressions are found to be quartic with R-squared values not less
than :96 and a 95% condence interval. The graph in gure 4.3 is a useful tool for
the KD's topology control function; for an observed node failure rate, it identies the
ideal number of links per node that a KD should assign to new nodes as they join.
Regressions by failure rate are shown in gures 4.1 and 4.2. More regressions can be
found at Appendix A.
4.3 Improved Asynchronous Rekeys with Heuristics Compared to Tree-
based Dissemination (No Heuristics)
This experiment shows that a network that has performed simple island detec-
tion and correction will exhibit greater fault tolerance than a tree-based dissemination
routine with no such heuristics during asynchronous rekeys, and for a reasonable cost.
Figure 4.4 shows the average number of nodes per healthy nodes that will miss
an asynchronous rekey \push" for both a random overlay network and a tree-based
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Figure 4.2: Fitness values by links, 40 percent failure rate
dissemination network. Even during periods of high failure rates, the proposed algo-
rithm maintains a high level of convergence while the tree-based dissemination routine
fails linearly with respect to node failure rate.
4.4 Random Overlay Compared to Managed \Torus" Overlay on Im-
proved Asynchronous Rekeys
This experiment compares randomized overlay topology against a managed
\torus" topology described in Chapter 3 with the goal of measuring the performance
benets of a managed overlay. Experimentation reveals that there are no tangible
performance benets to managing an overlay to such a degree.
Each topology is tested with the improved parameters from Section 4.2 for
multiple failure rates and produce the graph at gure 4.5. For the parameters specied
in Section 4.2, there is no signicant performance increase for utilizing a managed
overlay instead of a random overlay. In fact, the extra CTO messages required to
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Figure 4.3: Improved links parameter by node failure rate
Figure 4.4: Random overlay with island detection versus tree-based dissemination
without island detection
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Figure 4.5: Improved parameters, random overlay versus torus overlay
Table 4.1: Improved links
value for 100-node and 1000-node
groups, by failure rate
100 1000
5 237.86 2479.59
20 287.71 2765.91
35 363.19 3243.86
Table 4.2: Messages for 100-
node and 1000-node groups with
improved parameters, by failure
rate
100 1000
5 375.15 3842.7
20 411.52 3863.96
35 451.41 3947.86
bring a degraded torus topology back to a managed state make the torus topology
less ecient than randomization.
4.5 Scalability to 1000-node Groups
The results of the trials against the 1000-node input graphs indicate that the
proposed protocol is indeed scalable to very large groups. Quartic regressions are
shown in Figures 4.6, 4.7, and 4.8 that correspond to 5%, 20%, and 35% failure
rates, respectively. Minimizing the tness value for these regressions, ideal links and
messages values are calculated and shown in Tables 4.1 and 4.2. It is interesting to
note that as the failure rate increases, the total messages per node is actually lower
for the 1000-node group.
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Figure 4.6: Fitness values by links, 1000 nodes, 5 percent failure rate
Figure 4.7: Fitness values by links, 1000 nodes, 20 percent failure rate
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Figure 4.8: Fitness values by links, 1000 nodes, 35 percent failure rate
39
V. Conclusions
5.1 Signicance and Interpretation of Analysis
The results of the ve experiments indicate that the proposed protocol succeeds
in providing a lightweight, scalable, and fault-tolerant solution to the group key man-
agement problem. Parameter improvement provides a simple way of calculating more
ecient parameters for a given group based upon 1) the number of nodes in the group
and 2) the expected or calculated node failure rate in the group. Utilizing these pa-
rameters and simple heuristics to detect disjoint subgroups, the protocol achieves a
level of fault tolerance not attainable in current tree-based solutions. Additionally,
experiments demonstrate that random peer overlays suer no noticeable performance
disadvantage when compared to highly managed overlays.
The results of the analysis in Chapter 4 indicate the dierent objectives for
synchronous and asynchronous rekeys produce very dierent topologies with dierent
parameters. It is found that with the neighbor rekey request feature, synchronous
rekeys favor tree-like topologies. Conversely, asynchronous rekeys aim to deliver keys
with more links relative to the node failure rate on the network. The resultant topol-
ogy is a sparse mesh whose degree grows as the network's failure rate increases over
time.
Unfortunately a group cannot utilize both topologies at once, and the adminis-
trator must select one that is appropriate to the security requirements of the network.
For instance, if a group can tolerate a small number of nodes not having the group
key for the period of time between synchronous rekeys, he may opt to establish a
tree-based dissemination with neighbor rekey request capabilities to account for link
failures (versus node failures). On the other hand, if it is crucial that asynchronous
rekeys reach as many nodes as possible, the administrator might opt for the topology
with the number of links recommended via the solution in section 4.2. In either case,
the combination of heuristics provides an administrator with several advantages over
current physical dissemination schemes for a low overhead cost.
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5.2 Open Research
This research eort has practical application in any many wide-area distributed
computing environments, namely electrical power systems monitoring and control
and mobile ad hoc networks. The proposed key management protocol provides drop-
in security for distributed systems that lack dened roles and hierarchy or whose
topology changes over time.
Current eorts to monitor and control the electrical power grid such as NASPI
will benet greatly from power system simulations that incorporate security mecha-
nisms. Incorporating the proposed key management protocol into an electrical power
and network simulator (e.g., EPOCHS) can provide valuable information to Smart
Grid development teams. As the size of the NASPI network grows to many thousands
of sensors, the need for a simple, fault-tolerant security solution will be absolutely
critical.
Indeed, mobile ad hoc platforms are in greater need of a distributed security
solution than ever before. Unmanned aerial vehicles, which provide highly sensitive,
often classied video feeds to military commanders and intelligence personnel, have
been the subject of scrutiny since the discovery that these feeds are sent almost exclu-
sively unencrypted. As these networks grow in size and become more autonomous, the
need becomes imminent for an encryption solution. The proposed key management
protocol can provide an expedient solution for this circumstance, but there is more re-
search to be done before it can be deployed to a MANET environment. Further study
must be done in the area of peer selection and the viability of direct communication
with a key distributor. Specically, a sub-protocol for peer selection must consider
physical and spatial limitations when building the network, as it cannot reasonably
rely upon random generation. Additionally, direct communications with a trusted
key distributor may be very costly or impractical due to transmission capabilities and
land features. The plethora of prior research into physical MANET modeling and
peer selection suggest that an immediate investment in this eld is highly feasible.
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Appendix A. Additional Figures
Figure A.1: Fitness values by links, 10 percent failure rate
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Figure A.2: Fitness values by links, 15 percent failure rate
Figure A.3: Fitness values by links, 20 percent failure rate
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Figure A.4: Fitness values by links, 25 percent failure rate
Figure A.5: Fitness values by links, 30 percent failure rate
44
Figure A.6: Fitness values by links, 35 percent failure rate
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